A technology licence is a grant of permission, and the scope clause is the edge of that permission. Royalties, warranties, indemnities and termination rights all operate inside the boundary the scope clause draws. None of them repairs a boundary drawn too widely, and a boundary drawn too narrowly costs the licensee the deal it thought it had bought.
The clause usually receives the least drafting attention and produces the most disputes. Licensors discover after signature that “Asia-Pacific” reached a subsidiary nobody had assessed, that “manufacture and sell” allowed a contract manufacturer to supply a competitor, or that improvements belonged to the licensee because the agreement said nothing about them. Each of those outcomes was settled by a sentence that nobody read twice.
What follows works through the grant field by field: what each field controls, the wording that narrows it, the wording that quietly widens it, and the point in the transaction at which the choice has to be made. It assumes a foreign licensor and a Chinese licensee, although most of the analysis runs equally in the other direction, which matters for Chinese companies licensing technology out of the country.
What the grant has to settle
A clause reading “the Licensor grants the Licensee a licence to use the Technology in China” has answered one question, the territory, and left four open. The five variables are set out below, with the failure each one produces when it is left to inference.
| Variable | What it controls | Typical failure |
|---|---|---|
| Subject matter | What IP is licensed: patents, know-how, software, models, data | Vague references to “the Technology” without a schedule |
| Field of use | The products, applications or industries covered | Field defined by product name rather than function, so adjacent products are arguable |
| Territory | Where the licensed activity may occur | Regional definitions that do not match the licensee’s corporate structure |
| Entities | The licensee, its affiliates, contractors and customers | Unlimited affiliate extension; no list |
| Volume and users | Units, seats, servers, production lines | No cap, so a pilot licence scales into a platform licence |
Each variable should be answered in the agreement itself rather than inside the definition of “Technology”. A definition is read as a description; a grant is read as a permission. When the two conflict, a tribunal will usually prefer the specific permission, which is not the outcome a licensor wants when the specific permission was drafted carelessly.
Why the one-sentence grant fails
The failure comes from the definition, the verb and the place.
“The Technology” is a defined term that resolves to a schedule, and the schedule is usually the shortest annex in the agreement. If it lists categories rather than items, the definition does the work of the grant, and the definition was drafted by the party that wanted it broad.
“Use” is the widest verb available in licensing. It covers making, having made, selling, offering for sale, importing, exporting, reproducing, adapting, displaying, training on, and deriving from, depending on the subject matter. A grant of “use” over software will be read to include copying for installation; a grant of “use” over a model will be read by a licensee to include fine-tuning, because fine-tuning is a use.
“In China” describes a place, not an activity. It says nothing about whether goods made there may leave, whether a Chinese entity may serve a customer abroad, or whether a Hong Kong subsidiary is inside or outside the perimeter.
The order of decisions
The commercial order is usually this: the field is agreed first, because it defines what the licensee can sell; the territory second, because it defines where; the entities third, because the licensee’s group structure is known only after diligence; the volume metric last, because it depends on how the technology is deployed. Drafting in that order produces a coherent grant. Drafting in the order the template happens to be arranged produces a grant with a broad field, an undefined territory and an affiliate clause that was copied from a different deal.
Field of use
Field-of-use restrictions are lawful and common in China, and they work only if the field can be applied to a product by someone who is not in the room when the contract is signed.
Define by function, market and parameter
A field defined as “robotics” will be read broadly. A licensee developing an adjacent product will argue that its product is a robot, or that the restriction was intended to separate industrial from consumer applications, and the argument will be respectable. A field defined by reference to function, end market and technical parameters is narrower, testable and easier to enforce. “Autonomous mobile robots for warehouse logistics with payloads above 200 kilograms” tells an engineer, an auditor and a judge the same thing.
Three components do most of the work. Function describes what the product does, not what it is called. End market describes who buys it and for what purpose, which is what separates a medical imaging product from an inspection product built on the same model. Technical parameters give a measurable boundary, such as payload, throughput, latency or accuracy, and they are the component a tribunal can actually apply.
Product names are the weakest form of definition, because product names change. A licence granted for “the X200 platform” becomes ambiguous the moment the licensee renames the platform, and a licensee with a marketing department will rename it.
Straddle products and adjacent fields
Where the licensor wants to preserve adjacent fields for itself or for other licensees, the agreement should say what happens when a product straddles two fields. Three mechanisms are used. A straddle rule allocates the product to the field in which the majority of its value or function sits. A good-faith allocation mechanism requires the parties to agree a split before launch, with a default if they cannot. An exclusivity carve-out leaves the straddling product non-exclusive in the licensor’s field, which preserves the licensor’s freedom without blocking the licensee.
Whichever is chosen, the mechanism should name the decision-maker and the timetable. “The parties shall discuss in good faith” is not a mechanism; it is a description of the argument that follows.
Field drift
Products migrate. A model licensed for defect detection in a factory becomes a model licensed for quality inspection in a warehouse, and the licensee will describe the second as a natural extension of the first. A field clause that is fixed at signature and never revisited will be read against the licensor at the point of migration, because the licensor had the opportunity to anticipate the migration and did not.
Two responses are available. The first is to define the field by reference to the licensee’s product roadmap annexed at signature, so that migration beyond the roadmap is outside the grant. The second is to price the migration: a field-expansion mechanism with a stated royalty uplift, so that the licensee has a route to the adjacent market and the licensor is paid for it. The second is usually better commercially, because it converts a dispute into a negotiation with a price already agreed.
Specimen wording
The difference between the two drafts below is the difference between a grant and an option over the licensor’s whole portfolio.
The Licensor grants the Licensee a non-exclusive, non-transferable licence to use the Technology to develop, manufacture and sell robots in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Licensor grants the Licensee a non-exclusive, non-transferable licence, for the Term and within the Territory, to use the Technology solely to develop, manufacture, market and sell autonomous mobile robots for warehouse and distribution-centre logistics, with a rated payload of not less than 200 kilograms and not more than 1,500 kilograms, and solely for sale to end users and authorised integrators in the Territory. No licence is granted for any other product, application or field, including without limitation consumer robotics, medical devices, agricultural machinery or autonomous road vehicles.
The second draft is longer because it is doing more work. Note the four narrowing devices: a purpose limitation (“solely to”), a technical corridor with both a floor and a ceiling, a customer restriction, and an express exclusion list. The exclusion list matters more than it appears, because it forecloses the argument that an unmentioned application is included by implication.
Territory
Territory is about more than where goods are sold. It has to address four distinct activities, and each can be granted or withheld separately.
Four activities, four permissions
Manufacture, use, sale and export are different acts with different commercial consequences. A licence to “manufacture and sell in China” that says nothing about export allows the licensee to manufacture in China and sell into the licensor’s other markets, unless the agreement says otherwise. Conversely, a licence limited to “sale in China” may still permit manufacture for export where the manufacture clause is separate and unrestricted, which is the more common drafting error because manufacture is usually granted in an earlier clause and never revisited.
Use deserves separate attention in industrial and software licensing. Use of a model to generate outputs for a customer outside the territory is a use outside the territory even though no good crosses a border. Use of a manufacturing process to make goods that are then exported is a use inside the territory followed by an export. The two are treated differently by the export control rules and by the licensor’s own field strategy, and the agreement should say which is permitted.
Export as the commercial crux
For a foreign licensor, the export question is usually where the deal is won or lost. The Chinese licensee will want export rights because the domestic market is competitive and its cost base travels well. The licensor will resist because export converts a China licence into a global competitor.
The workable middle is a staged permission: export permitted to named countries, or to countries outside a named list, with a notification obligation, a royalty differential and a right for the licensor to withdraw a country if it appoints a licensee there. That structure gives the licensee a growth path and gives the licensor a veto it can exercise without terminating the whole agreement.
Export also carries a regulatory overlay that the licence should acknowledge. Goods incorporating controlled technology may require an export licence from the Chinese authorities, and the licensor’s home jurisdiction may impose its own re-export controls on goods made with its technology. A licence that grants export rights without allocating responsibility for those filings creates an obligation the licensee cannot perform.
Territory and corporate geography
Regional definitions frequently fail to match the licensee’s corporate structure. “Greater China” is a commercial phrase, not a legal one: it may or may not include Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, and the licensee’s group may serve those markets from a different entity. “Asia-Pacific” is worse, because it can reach India, Japan, Korea, Australia and, in some drafts, the west coast of the United States.
The reliable approach is to define the territory by reference to a list of countries and customs territories, annexed as a schedule, with a rule for how the list changes. Where the licensor wants to grant China only, say “mainland China” and add that Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are excluded. Where the licensor wants to include them, grant them separately, because the enforcement position and the regulatory position differ in each.
Territory should also be tied to the licensee’s registered place of business rather than to the place of performance. A licensee that performs services from Shenzhen for a customer in Germany is performing inside the territory and selling outside it, and the agreement should decide whether that is permitted before the first invoice is issued.
Entities
The licensee is a defined company. Whether its affiliates, contract manufacturers and distributors are covered is a separate decision, and it should be made expressly rather than by extending the definition of “Licensee”.
Affiliates by control threshold
An undefined reference to affiliates can extend a China-only licence to a global group, including entities the licensor has never assessed. The standard fix is a named schedule, a control threshold and an update mechanism: affiliates are the entities listed in Schedule 2, being entities controlled by the licensee within the meaning of a stated threshold, and new entities may be added by written notice, with the licensor’s consent required where the new entity is in a jurisdiction outside the territory.
The threshold itself needs care. “Control” defined as more than fifty per cent of voting rights is conventional and will not capture a joint venture in which the licensee holds forty per cent but appoints the general manager. Where the licensee operates through joint ventures, variable interest entities or a listed subsidiary with minority shareholders, the definition should be drafted to capture the commercial reality, or the schedule should name the entities and avoid the definition entirely.
Change of control
A change-of-control clause does two things. It ensures that an affiliate which leaves the group ceases to be covered, so the licence does not follow a divested business. It also ensures that a licensee which is acquired does not bring the licence to the acquirer for free, which is the more valuable of the two where the licensee is a founder-led company in a market where acquisition is likely.
The clause should state the consequence, not merely the trigger. Options include termination on notice, a consent right for the licensor, or an automatic royalty step-up. A clause that says the licensor “may review” the change of control is not a right.
Contract manufacturers
A licence to manufacture is not a licence to have someone else manufacture. Where the licensee uses contract manufacturers, the agreement should require prior written approval of each subcontractor, a back-to-back confidentiality and use restriction, and a direct undertaking from the subcontractor to the licensor where the technology is sensitive. The licensor should have a right to audit the subcontractor’s premises, because the risk of leakage is highest at the smallest supplier.
The grant should also say what the subcontractor may not do: sell licensed product on its own account, use the technology for any other customer, retain tooling or firmware after the relationship ends, or sub-contract further. Each of those is a common practice in Chinese manufacturing clusters, and each is outside a licence that does not mention it.
Customers and embedded technology
Where the licensed technology is embedded in a product the licensee sells, the customer receives a product that contains the licensor’s technology. That is not usually a sublicence, and it should not be described as one, because describing it as a sublicence invites the customer to claim rights the licensor never intended to grant. The cleaner structure is an express permission to sell products incorporating the technology, coupled with a prohibition on the customer extracting, reverse engineering or reusing the technology and a statement that no licence is granted to the customer.
Where the licensee provides the technology as a service to its own customers, the analysis changes, because the customer is using the technology. A hosted-service permission with a defined customer type and a prohibition on resale is the usual answer.
Volume, users and production limits
Volume caps convert a licence into a scalable commercial instrument. They are common in software, model licensing and manufacturing know-how, and they work only if the measurement is defined.
The metric must be observable
For software, the metric might be named users, concurrent sessions, servers or API calls. For manufacturing, it might be units produced per year, production lines or sites. For models, it might be inference volume or deployment environments. Each metric has a measurement point, and the measurement point determines whether the cap can be verified.
Named users are observable in the licensee’s directory but not in the licensor’s. Concurrent sessions are observable at the licence server. Units produced are observable in the licensee’s production records and, less reliably, in its sales records. Inference volume is observable if the deployment reports, and invisible if it does not. The licensor should choose a metric that its own technical controls can see, or accept that the cap will be verified only on audit.
Reporting and true-up
Whatever the metric, the agreement needs a reporting obligation, an audit right and a consequence for overage. Reporting should be periodic, in a stated format, certified by an officer, and delivered whether or not the volume has changed. A nil return is information; silence is not.
A true-up mechanism is often better than a hard cap. The licensee reports actual volume each quarter, pays the difference between the cap and actual usage at the agreed rate, and the cap resets. That structure keeps the licensee inside the agreement as it grows, which is what both parties want, and it avoids the cliff edge where a licensee that exceeds the cap by one unit is in breach of the whole licence.
Overage
Where a hard cap is retained, the consequence of exceeding it should be graduated. A small overage attracts an uplift in royalty. A material overage attracts the uplift plus the audit cost. A repeated or deliberate overage attracts a termination right. A cap with a single consequence, termination, will not be enforced in practice, because the licensor will not terminate a profitable licensee over a minor breach, and the licensee knows it.
A cap without a measurement mechanism is a cap in name only. That sentence is worth repeating to any commercial team that proposes a volume limit without a reporting clause.
The royalty base and what sits on top of it
The royalty clause is only as good as the base. A rate applied to an undefined base is an argument with a number attached.
Defining net sales
“Net sales” should be defined with an exhaustive list of permitted deductions, such as returns, taxes, freight and documented discounts, rather than a general reference to customary deductions. The difference matters because the licensee’s finance team will apply its own customary deductions, which include items the licensor has never seen.
The deductions should be listed, not categorised, so that a new deduction requires an amendment. The base should state the point in the transaction at which it is measured, gross invoice value or cash received, because the two differ where payment terms are long. And it should state the treatment of sales to affiliates, which should normally be measured at the price to the first unaffiliated customer, otherwise a licensee can sell to its own trading company at cost and report a royalty of almost nothing.
Allocation where the technology is a component
Where the licensed technology is a component of a larger product, an allocation method is needed. Options include a stated percentage of the end-product price, a per-unit amount, or a formula based on the licensed feature’s contribution. The method should be chosen at term-sheet stage, because it determines the economics and is difficult to renegotiate later.
A percentage of the end-product price is simple and generous to the licensor where the component is a small part of the value. A per-unit amount is simple and predictable and becomes unfair as the product’s price rises. A contribution formula is the most accurate and the most expensive to administer, because it requires the parties to agree what the contribution is. For AI-enabled hardware, where the model is a small part of the bill of materials but a large part of the customer’s reason to buy, the contribution question is the whole negotiation.
Minimums and milestones
A minimum annual royalty converts a non-exclusive licence into a licence with a floor, and an exclusive licence into a licence with a condition. Milestones do the same at the development stage: a prototype date, a certification date, a first commercial shipment. Both should be paired with a consequence that the licensor will actually use, which is usually conversion of exclusivity to non-exclusivity rather than termination.
Currency, withholding and the remittance file
Royalties paid from China to a foreign licensor are generally subject to withholding tax, reduced under an applicable double tax treaty where the licensor is the beneficial owner and the procedural conditions are met. The contract should state whether the royalty is gross or net and who bears the tax, because the difference between a gross and a net royalty is often several percentage points of return.
The mechanics behind that sentence are where foreign licensors lose money. The Chinese payer withholds enterprise income tax on the gross amount and remits the balance. Treaty relief is not automatic: the licensor usually has to obtain a certificate of tax residency from its home authority and provide it to the payer, and the payer files the relief claim. Where the licensor cannot produce the certificate in time for the first payment, tax is withheld at the domestic rate and the difference is recovered later, if at all.
Value added tax sits alongside the income tax. A cross-border service is generally subject to VAT withheld by the payer, and a technology transfer that qualifies can be exempt, but the exemption is claimed through a filing and a recognised technology contract rather than granted by the invoice. The agreement should allocate the VAT and identify which party prepares the filing, because a licensor that has never heard of the exemption will pay VAT it did not need to pay.
Foreign exchange adds a third layer. The remitting bank will ask for the contract, the invoice, the tax record and, above the threshold set in the foreign exchange rules, a tax filing for the outward payment. The documents have to be consistent: the contract’s description of the service, the invoice’s description and the tax filing’s classification must say the same thing. Build the timing into the payment terms rather than discovering it at the first invoice, when the licensee’s finance team is already behind.
Audit mechanics
Audit rights should specify the notice period, the scope of records, who bears the cost, and the consequence of a material understatement. The consequence is typically payment of the shortfall plus the audit cost and, where the shortfall exceeds a threshold, a termination right.
The clause should also require the licensee to procure access to subcontractors’ records, because the royalty-bearing production may occur at a factory the licensor has never visited. And it should define the retention period for records, which in practice sets the practical limit on how far back an audit can reach.
Term, termination and survival
Chinese law does not provide a general right to terminate a technology licence at will. Termination for convenience exists only if the contract creates it, and even then it should be paired with a wind-down period, a sell-off right and payment for work in progress.
Grounds
The grounds that matter in practice are material breach with a cure period, insolvency, change of control where the licensor has reserved the right, failure to meet a minimum or a milestone, and a regulatory event that makes performance unlawful. Each should be defined with enough precision to be operable. “Material breach” without a cure period invites an argument about whether the breach was capable of cure; a cure period without a definition of cure invites an argument about whether the cure was adequate.
Convenience
Where a convenience right is negotiated, it should be priced. A termination fee calculated by reference to the remaining minimum royalties, or a notice period long enough for the licensee to redeploy its team, converts an option into a commercial decision. A convenience right with no price is an option the licensee holds and the licensor pays for.
Survival and the installed base
The survival clause decides what happens to products already in the field. At minimum it should preserve confidentiality, accrued royalty payments, audit rights for completed periods, a licence to use background IP to service, maintain and supply spare parts for products sold before termination for a defined period, and the licensee’s obligation to cease new production and to return or destroy confidential materials.
Without a survival right, continued use after termination is infringement, including firmware updates and spare parts. That is a problem for the licensor’s customers as much as for the licensee, and it is the reason a licensor that terminates aggressively without a survival clause often finds itself pressured by its own installed base to reinstate.
Defining the licensed subject matter
The schedule that defines the technology is the most important annex in the agreement, and it is usually the shortest.
The schedule
A proper definition identifies each element by reference to something a court can examine: patent numbers and jurisdictions, software modules and versions, model architectures and checkpoints, datasets and their provenance, and know-how described by reference to documents and processes. A general reference to “the Technology” invites the argument that an improved version, a new module or a related patent is included.
For patents, list the family, the jurisdiction and the status, and state whether continuations, divisionals and reissues are included. For software, list modules, versions and the delivery medium. For know-how, list the documents, the processes and the personnel who hold the knowledge, because know-how that exists only in an engineer’s head is difficult to deliver and impossible to audit. For data, list the datasets, their source, their licence basis and any restrictions on onward use.
Versions and updates
Version control matters as much as identification. A licence to “version 3.2 of the software, as updated from time to time” is broader than a licence to “version 3.2”. The licensor should decide whether updates are included, whether they are included only where they are backward compatible, and whether major versions carry an additional fee.
The same question arises for models. A licence to a checkpoint is not a licence to the next checkpoint trained on more data, and a licensee that receives a continuous update feed is receiving a series of grants. Where updates are included, the agreement should say whether the licensee must adopt them, because a licensee that refuses an update for stability reasons will later claim support for the old version.
Third-party and open-source components
Where the technology includes third-party components, the schedule should identify them and the licence should flow down the third party’s terms. Open-source components raise a separate question: a licence that requires the licensee to comply with the open-source terms may conflict with the licensor’s own restrictions, and the conflict should be resolved before signature rather than in an audit.
A practical test is to ask, for each component, whether the licensor could grant the permission it is purporting to grant. If the answer depends on a third party’s consent, the schedule should say so and the grant should be conditioned accordingly. Licensors that skip this step discover the problem when the licensee’s counsel runs a software composition analysis during due diligence, which is the worst possible moment.
Exclusivity, improvements and sublicensing
Four degrees
An exclusive licence is a transfer of commercial opportunity, and it should be priced and conditioned accordingly. Four degrees are common: exclusive even as against the licensor, exclusive except for the licensor’s own use, sole (one licensee, with the licensor free to sell), and non-exclusive. Each should be stated expressly, because a clause that says “exclusive” without qualification will be read against the licensor.
Exclusivity can also be split by field or by channel, which is often the better commercial answer. An exclusive grant for warehouse robotics and a non-exclusive grant for everything else gives the licensee the segment it can actually serve without closing the licensor out of the rest.
Performance conditions
Exclusivity should carry performance conditions. A minimum royalty, a minimum sales target, a development milestone or a market-launch date converts an exclusive grant into a conditional one. Without a condition, an exclusive licensee that does nothing still blocks the licensor from appointing a better partner.
The territory of exclusivity should match the licensee’s actual capability. An exclusive licence for “Greater China” granted to a company with a sales office in Shanghai is usually a mistake, because the licensee cannot serve Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan and the licensor has given away the right to appoint someone who can.
Improvements
Improvements are where licensors lose the value they thought they had retained. The default position under Chinese law is that the party that creates an improvement owns it. A licensor that licenses technology to a joint venture or a manufacturer and does not address improvements will find that the licensee owns the improvements and can use them, including in competition with the licensor.
Three structures are available. A grant-back licence requires the licensee to license its improvements to the licensor, usually royalty-free or on reciprocal terms. An assignment clause requires the licensee to assign improvements to the licensor, which is more valuable but harder to negotiate and may raise competition concerns where it is not necessary to the licensor’s legitimate interest. A field-split allocates improvements by application, so that improvements in the licensed field belong to the licensee and improvements in the licensor’s other fields belong to the licensor.
Whichever structure is chosen, the agreement should define what counts as an improvement, who decides whether a development is an improvement, and how the parties share the cost of protection. The definition should be technical rather than evaluative: a change that improves a stated metric by a stated margin is an improvement; a change that the parties consider significant is an argument.
Where development is joint, the statutory default permits each party to use the result and requires agreement before licensing it to a third party. That default is workable for research collaboration and unworkable for a commercial licence, so the contract should displace it expressly rather than rely on it.
Sublicensing and contract manufacturing
Sublicensing to affiliates is a separate question from sublicensing to third parties. A blanket right to sublicense to affiliates converts a China licence into a group licence, and it should be replaced by a named list, a control threshold and a change-of-control provision.
For third parties, the default should be prohibition with a consent mechanism. Where consent is given, the sublicence should be back-to-back, shorter than the head licence, terminable on termination of the head licence, and accompanied by a direct confidentiality undertaking to the licensor where the technology is sensitive. The licensor should also receive a copy of the sublicence, because a licensor that has never seen the document cannot enforce it.
China’s technology transfer regime
China’s technology import and export regime regulates the transfer of technology across the border. The rules have been liberalised over the past decade, and three points remain relevant for a foreign licensor.
The catalogue decides the process
Certain categories of technology are prohibited or restricted for import or export, and a licence that falls within a restricted category requires registration or approval. The classification should be checked against the catalogue in force at signature, not against the version that was current when the commercial discussion began, because the catalogue is revised and the revision can move a technology between categories.
Free technology is not entirely free of process. The contract still leaves a paper trail that the tax authority and the bank will examine, and the practical question for a foreign licensor is not whether the technology is regulated but what the local commerce authority will require before it will accept the file.
Registration, tax and remittance
Technology import contracts must be registered with the commerce authorities for foreign exchange and tax purposes, and the registration is usually a condition for remitting royalties. The registration is administrative, but it requires the contract and its Chinese translation to be consistent. A translation that softens a restriction, or that converts a licence into an assignment, will be the version the authorities read.
The sequence below is the one that foreign licensors most often discover in the wrong order.
| Step | Authority | Typical timing | What foreign companies miss |
|---|---|---|---|
| Classify the technology against the catalogue | Commerce authority, usually through local counsel | Before signature | The category is fixed by the catalogue in force at signature, not at the start of negotiations |
| Register the import contract | Local commerce authority | Before the first remittance | The Chinese translation must match the English, including the restrictions |
| Withholding filing and tax payment | District tax bureau | Before remittance | Treaty relief needs a tax residency certificate from the licensor’s home authority |
| Outward remittance | Remitting bank | After the tax record | The bank checks that the contract, the invoice and the tax filing describe the same service |
| Record a patent or trademark licence | CNIPA | Early in the term | Recordal is what makes the licence visible to third parties and to an acquirer |
| Recognise a technology contract for VAT | Local science and technology authority | Before the first VAT filing | An exemption is claimed, not granted automatically |
The timings are indicative. Local practice varies by district, and the file is usually the binding constraint rather than the law.
Mandatory rules that survive the governing law
Indemnity and liability provisions in technology import contracts are subject to mandatory rules that cannot be excluded by choosing foreign law. A clause that purports to exclude the licensor’s liability for infringement of third-party rights may be unenforceable in China even if it is valid under the governing law. The same applies to clauses that purport to exclude liability for defects in the technology, or that impose all risk on the licensee in terms a Chinese tribunal will regard as unconscionable.
The practical consequence is that a licensor choosing English law and Singapore arbitration should still have the contract reviewed against Chinese mandatory rules, because the award will be enforced in China and the enforcing court will apply those rules to the extent they are mandatory.
Outbound licensing
The regime runs in both directions. A Chinese company licensing technology to a foreign group, or contributing technology to an offshore joint venture, faces an export classification and, where the technology is restricted, an approval. Data leaving the country with the technology may trigger a separate assessment. A foreign licensee that receives technology from a Chinese partner should establish, before the transfer, which party is responsible for the export filing and what happens if approval is refused.
Data, models and outputs
Licensing a model is not the same as licensing software, and the scope clause should reflect the difference.
The grant should address inference rights, training rights, fine-tuning rights, distillation rights and the right to use outputs. A licensee that is granted “the right to use the model” may argue that it includes fine-tuning, because fine-tuning is a use. A licensor that intends to reserve fine-tuning should say so, and should also say whether the reservation covers evaluation, red-teaming and benchmarking, which are uses that a technical team will not regard as commercial and a licensor may regard as leakage.
Output ownership is a separate question. The agreement should state whether outputs belong to the licensee, to the licensor or to neither, and whether the licensee may use outputs to train a competing model. That last point is the one that matters commercially, because outputs are the raw material for distillation.
Data used for training raises compliance questions under Chinese law. Where personal information or important data is involved, the transfer may require a security assessment, a standard contract or certification, and the licence should allocate responsibility for those filings. The allocation should identify who prepares the assessment, who bears the cost, and what happens to the licence if the assessment is refused.
Dispute resolution and technical expert determination
Licence disputes are usually technical before they are legal. Whether a product falls within the field, whether an improvement is an improvement, whether a royalty report is accurate: these questions are better answered by an engineer than by a judge.
A tiered clause that requires the parties to appoint a joint technical expert, with a defined timetable and a final determination, resolves most scope disputes without arbitration. Where arbitration follows, the clause should permit the tribunal to appoint its own expert and should define the weight to be given to the joint expert’s determination. Without that definition, the joint expert’s report becomes one piece of evidence among many and the cost of the process is duplicated.
The seat and the institution matter for enforcement. China enforces foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention, and enforcement of foreign court judgments is far less reliable, which is why arbitration is the default in cross-border licences with a Chinese party. The clause should also address interim relief, because a licensor that discovers leakage needs an injunction quickly and an arbitration clause that reserves the application to the tribunal will cost it months.
Practical checklist
- Write the scope as five answered questions, not one sentence, and check that the answers are consistent with each other.
- Define the field by function, market and technical parameters rather than by product name, and add an exclusion list.
- Separate manufacture, use, sale and export in the territory clause, and define the territory by country list rather than by region.
- List affiliates by name with a control threshold, a change-of-control provision and a consent mechanism for new jurisdictions.
- Choose a volume metric the licensor’s own controls can observe, with periodic reporting, a true-up and a graduated overage remedy.
- Fix the royalty base, the measurement point and the treatment of affiliate sales before the term sheet is signed.
- Decide the withholding and VAT position, name the party that files, and build the remittance file into the payment timetable.
- Attach a schedule that identifies every licensed element by number, version and document, including third-party and open-source components.
- State the degree of exclusivity, attach performance conditions to it, and decide the improvement structure before the first engineering meeting.
- Check the technology against the import and export catalogue, register the contract, and have the mandatory-rules position reviewed before signature.
The cost of getting these right is a week of drafting at the term-sheet stage. The cost of getting them wrong is a licence that grants more than the licensor owns, a royalty that cannot be measured, and a dispute that turns on a sentence nobody read twice.
Geason Law Offices advises foreign licensors and Chinese licensees on the structure and drafting of technology licences. The technology licensing service page sets out how we handle the transaction, and the related guides on licensing AI models and model weights to Chinese partners and contributing IP to a Chinese joint venture deal with the two situations in which the scope clause carries the most commercial weight.
Frequently Asked Questions↑ Back to article
What are the core elements of a licence scope clause?
Five variables: the licensed subject matter, the field of use, the territory, the permitted entities (the licensee and its affiliates) and the volume or user limits. A licence that addresses only the subject matter and the territory leaves the other three to argument, and those are where disputes usually arise.
Should the licence extend to the licensee's affiliates?
Only if the deal requires it, and then on defined terms. An undefined reference to affiliates can extend a China-only licence to a global group, including entities the licensor has never assessed. Define affiliates by control threshold and by a closing date, and require a schedule of named entities with an update mechanism.
How should royalties be calculated for a China licence?
The base should be defined precisely — net sales, units shipped, revenue attributable to the licensed feature — with deductions listed exhaustively rather than by category. Where the licence covers a component inside a larger product, an allocation method is needed, and audits should be permitted with a defined notice period and a consequence for underreporting.
Is withholding tax deducted from royalties paid to a foreign licensor?
Yes. Royalties paid from China to a foreign entity are generally subject to withholding tax, with the rate reduced under an applicable double tax treaty where the licensor is the beneficial owner and the procedural conditions are met. The contract should state whether the royalty is gross or net and who bears the tax, because the difference is material to the net return.
Can a licence be terminated for convenience?
Only if the contract says so. Chinese law does not provide a general right to terminate a technology licence at will, and termination for convenience without an express clause may itself be a breach. Where a convenience right is negotiated, it should be paired with a wind-down period, a sell-off right and a payment for work in progress.
What survives termination of a technology licence?
Whatever the survival clause provides: confidentiality, payment for accrued royalties, audit rights for completed periods, and any licence needed to service products already in the field. Without a survival right, continued use of background IP after termination is infringement, including for spare parts and firmware updates.
Does a technology licence need to be registered in China?
The old requirement to register technology import contracts was removed, but the transaction still has tax, foreign exchange and, where the technology is restricted, regulatory consequences. Registration of the underlying IP — patents and trademarks — is separate and matters for enforcement, not for the validity of the licence between the parties.