Every supplier with a Chinese distributor faces the same commercial problem: the distributor discounts, the brand suffers, other distributors complain, and the obvious solution — set a minimum price — is the one that competition law treats most harshly.

China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, amended in 2022, treats vertical price restrictions as monopoly agreements, and resale price maintenance carries a presumption of illegality. That does not make channel control impossible. It makes it a drafting and evidence problem rather than an instruction.

The distinction matters commercially because most suppliers do not want a price floor for its own sake. They want the distributor to invest in demonstration stock, trained staff, installation and after-sales service, and they fear that a discounter who does none of those things will take the sales. Competition law in China allows most of that investment to be protected. What it does not allow is the shortcut of telling the channel what to charge and policing it.

Article 18 of the Anti-Monopoly Law prohibits monopoly agreements between business operators and their trading counterparties that fix the price at which the counterparty resells, or that set a minimum resale price.

The enforcement consequence is a presumption: once the authority establishes that a resale price restriction exists, the supplier must prove that it does not substantially restrict competition. The factors that can support that proof include the supplier’s market share, the competitive structure of the market, the effect on entry, and the efficiencies generated.

In practice, the defence is difficult. The authorities have pursued resale price maintenance across consumer goods, automotive, medical devices and platform businesses, and the published decisions show limited appetite for accepting efficiency arguments where a fixed minimum price has been imposed and monitored.

Two features of the Chinese rule are worth stating plainly, because they differ from the antitrust regimes foreign counsel know best. Dominance is irrelevant to the prohibition: a supplier with five per cent of the market can infringe the vertical agreement rule, whereas a termination by the same supplier could not be an abuse of dominance because it is not dominant. And the prohibition attaches to the agreement, not to its effect on the market, with the effect entering only through the presumption and the defence. A supplier that reasons “we are too small to matter” has misread which rule applies.

How the vertical monopoly rule is applied

The analysis runs in a sequence, and each step has a documentary consequence. A supplier that can show the authority how it worked through the sequence before the investigation began is in a different position from one that reconstructs the analysis afterwards.

Step one: is there an agreement? The law reaches agreements and concerted practices, not merely signed contracts. A written price clause is the easy case. Harder cases are the ones the authority sees most often: a recommendation that is monitored and enforced, a rebate withheld when a distributor discounts, a supply allocation reduced after a price cut, or a regional manager’s message that a discount “will be remembered” at the next allocation. The agreement can be inferred from the course of dealing, and it usually is.

Step two: what is the price term? The prohibition is directed at fixing the resale price and at setting a minimum. It reaches indirect forms: a fixed margin, a guaranteed profit, a “price protection” payment that makes a discount uneconomic, a requirement to obtain approval before discounting, and a rule that all channels must be priced identically. A term that leaves the distributor free to choose its price but makes any deviation commercially painful is a price term in substance.

Step three: the presumption. Once the term is established, the supplier carries the burden. This is the point at which most defences fail, because the file contains no market analysis and the commercial team’s explanation is that discounting “damages the brand”. Brand protection is a legitimate commercial objective; it is not, by itself, evidence that competition is not substantially restricted.

Step four: rebutting the presumption. The factors are market share, the structure of the market, barriers to entry, and efficiencies. In practice a credible rebuttal looks like this: the supplier holds a small share of a market defined with independent data; inter-brand competition is intense and buyers can switch; entry is easy; the restraint covers a minority of the channel; and the price term is a maximum rather than a floor. A rebuttal built on the supplier’s own estimate of its share, with no market definition, rarely succeeds.

Step five: the exemption route. The Anti-Monopoly Law contains exemptions for agreements that serve defined objectives — improving technology, product quality or efficiency, unifying product standards, or serving the public interest — provided competition is not substantially restricted and consumers share the benefit. The exemption is narrow and requires evidence of the benefit, not an assertion of it. A supplier that wants to rely on it should be able to describe the efficiency, measure it and show that a less restrictive alternative was considered.

Step six: the consequences. An infringement leads to an order to cease, a fine calculated on turnover, and confiscation of illegal gains. It also affects the civil position: a distributor sued for breaching a price clause can argue that the clause is invalid, and a distributor or customer that can show loss can claim damages. The administrative decision, once published, becomes the anchor for those claims.

The evidence the authority actually relies on is mundane and internal. WeChat and email traffic between the sales team and distributors, price-monitoring spreadsheets, rebate schedules with a price-compliance column, meeting minutes that record a “price alignment” discussion, distributor complaint files, and the sales incentive plan. An investigation that starts with a distributor complaint will obtain all of it, and the company’s own records will do most of the authority’s work.

What the 2022 amendments changed

The 2022 revision of the Anti-Monopoly Law did not decriminalise resale price maintenance. It clarified the framework in three respects that matter to suppliers.

First, it codified the burden of proof. For vertical agreements fixing resale price or minimum resale price, the authority establishes the agreement and the supplier must prove that it does not substantially restrict competition. That reverses the ordinary burden and places the evidential work on the company that imposed the term.

Second, it introduced a share-based safe harbour. Where the operators concerned fall below the market share thresholds set in the implementing rules and satisfy the other conditions, the agreement may be treated as outside the prohibition. The threshold currently applied to vertical agreements is fifteen per cent for each party, subject to conditions, and it should be confirmed against the current rules before it is relied on.

Third, it raised the penalties and made them easier to apply. The turnover-based fine, the ability to impose it on the parent, and the publication of the decision all increase the cost of an arrangement that is found to be unlawful.

The practical effect is that the analysis has shifted from whether a price term exists to whether the supplier can document the market context in which it operates.

The safe harbour in practice

The share threshold is a screening device, not a licence. Several conditions sit alongside it.

The agreement must not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition in the relevant market. The relevant market must be defined, which requires a product and geographic analysis that most suppliers have never prepared. And the supplier must be able to evidence its share, which means independent market data rather than an internal estimate.

Where a supplier has ten per cent of a niche market and can document it, the safe harbour may be available. Where the same supplier has ten per cent of a broadly defined market but forty per cent of the segment that matters to the distributor, the analysis is contestable, and the authority will define the market in the way that reflects the competitive constraint.

The prudent course is to treat the safe harbour as a reason to document the market analysis, not as a reason to stop worrying about the clause.

What is prohibited, and what is merely risky

ArrangementRisk levelComment
Fixed minimum resale priceHighThe core prohibition; presumption of illegality
Fixed resale price at a specific figureHighSame analysis
Maximum resale priceMediumLess restrictive, but still a price term
Recommended retail price, non-bindingLowAcceptable if genuinely voluntary
Price monitoring plus sanctionsHighConverts a recommendation into a fixed price
Rebates conditional on price complianceHighIndirect enforcement of a price floor
Uniform pricing across all channelsHighEspecially where online and offline prices are aligned by instruction

The line is not between “price” and “no price”. It is between a term that constrains the distributor’s commercial freedom and a suggestion it can ignore without consequence. Monitoring, audits, withheld rebates, delayed supply and termination for discounting all convert a recommendation into an enforceable price.

Three arrangements sit close to the line and deserve separate mention because they are common in technology channels.

A “price protection” or margin guarantee, under which the supplier tops up the distributor’s margin if it sells below a target, is a minimum price with a payment attached. It removes the commercial consequence of discounting and therefore removes the competitive pressure the law is protecting.

A discount approval process, under which the distributor must obtain the supplier’s consent before offering a promotion, is a price-fixing mechanism whatever it is called. A promotion fund that is available only for promotions at or above a stated price has the same character.

And a “no online discount” rule, whether it appears in the distribution agreement, the platform store authorisation or a brand guidelines document, is a price restriction. The channel does not change the analysis, which the authority has made clear in the platform cases.

Enforcement exposure

Administrative enforcement is led by the State Administration for Market Regulation and its local bureaus. The penalties are fines of one to ten per cent of the previous year’s turnover, with higher penalties where the circumstances are aggravated, plus orders to cease the conduct and confiscation of illegal gains.

Private enforcement follows. Distributors that were terminated for discounting, or that were required to maintain a price, can bring damages claims, and follow-on claims commonly follow a published administrative decision.

The reputational dimension matters for foreign suppliers: a published decision naming the company and describing the arrangement is read by distributors, customers and competitors, and it is often more damaging than the fine.

The 2022 amendments sharpened the personal dimension as well. The law now allows penalties on responsible individuals in defined circumstances, which changes the internal conversation: a country manager who has been instructing distributors on price is exposed personally, and the instruction is documented in the channel’s chat records.

For a listed parent, the consequences extend to disclosure. A fine of a percentage of turnover can be material, and the investigation itself may require disclosure in another jurisdiction. That is a board-level issue in a way that a distributor dispute is not.

Channel-control tools that survive scrutiny

Channel control is a legitimate objective, and there are lawful ways to pursue it. The tools below are ordered from least to most restrictive, and each can be combined with the others.

Publish a recommended price, state in the agreement that it is non-binding, and ensure that no commercial consequence attaches to deviation. Do not monitor compliance for the purpose of enforcement.

The detail decides whether the recommendation is genuinely voluntary. The policy should say in terms that the distributor sets its own resale price, that the recommendation is for guidance only, and that the distributor may price above or below it. The commercial team should not request price reports, and the CRM should not contain a field for distributor price compliance. Where a distributor asks whether the recommendation is mandatory, the answer should be scripted and should be the same from every account manager.

Maximum prices

A cap on resale price is less restrictive than a floor and is generally easier to justify, but it should still be assessed in context and documented.

A maximum price has a consumer-protection logic that a minimum price lacks: it prevents a distributor with local market power from extracting supra-competitive margins from end customers. That logic should be written into the policy rationale, because it is the argument the authority will test. A cap set so low that it eliminates the distributor’s margin is a different instrument and should be analysed as one.

Selective distribution

Appoint distributors against objective, published criteria — service capability, technical competence, showroom standards, staff training — and apply them without discrimination. The system must be proportionate to the product and must not be used to fix prices indirectly.

The criteria are the whole system. They should be measurable, published to applicants, applied through a documented process, and reviewed on a stated cycle. Criteria that are subjective (“suitable brand fit”) or that correlate with price behaviour (“committed to maintaining value”) invite the conclusion that the system exists to select non-discounters. Where the product genuinely requires trained installation or a demonstration environment, the criteria should describe the requirement and how it is verified.

Service-level obligations

Instead of controlling price, require pre-sales support, installation, warranty response times and spare parts stocking. These obligations raise the distributor’s cost base and reduce the incentive to discount, without fixing price.

This is the most underused tool in the set, and for technology products it is the most defensible. A distributor that must hold demonstration units, employ certified technicians and respond to a warranty call within a stated time carries costs that a box-shifter does not, and those costs make deep discounting uneconomic without any instruction about price. The obligations should be specific enough to audit: the number of demonstration units, the certification standard, the response time, the spare parts inventory.

Territorial and customer restrictions

These are also vertical restraints and are analysed separately, but they are more defensible where they protect investment in a territory or prevent free-riding on pre-sales service. They should be drafted narrowly and reviewed for competition risk.

A territory that is genuinely exclusive, with the supplier declining to appoint a second distributor and supporting the distributor’s local marketing, is easier to justify than a restriction that prevents a distributor from responding to unsolicited orders. Customer restrictions — a rule that the distributor may sell only to a defined segment — are harder to defend unless the segments have different service requirements.

Agency and consignment

Where the supplier bears the commercial risk and sets the end price, the relationship may be characterised as agency rather than resale, which changes the analysis. The characterisation must match the actual allocation of risk, not merely the label.

The indicators are the ones a tax or competition authority would use: who invoices the customer, who bears the credit risk, who holds the stock, who sets the end terms, and how the intermediary is paid. A commission agent that sells in the supplier’s name at the supplier’s price is not reselling, and a price instruction to an agent is not resale price maintenance in the same sense. A “distributor” that takes title, invoices the customer and bears the bad debt is reselling, whatever the agreement calls it, and an end-price instruction to that party is a price restraint.

Minimum advertised price policies

A policy that governs advertising rather than resale price is generally lower risk than a resale price floor, provided it is not enforced as a de facto price rule and does not restrict the distributor’s ability to set its own price.

The distinction is between what the distributor says and what it charges. A rule that a distributor may not advertise a price below a stated figure is an advertising rule. A rule that a distributor may not sell below that figure is a price rule. The policy has to stay on the advertising side of the line in its sanctions as well: a distributor that advertises below the figure may lose cooperative advertising funding, but should not lose supply.

Volume rebates and incentive design

Rebates are lawful and useful, and they become a price mechanism when they are conditioned on price behaviour. A volume rebate, a market-development rebate tied to agreed activities, and a service rebate tied to warranty performance are all defensible. A rebate that is reduced when a distributor discounts is a sanction for discounting and converts the whole arrangement into a price floor.

The same test applies to the sales team’s incentives. A country manager whose bonus depends on the achieved street price will manage the street price, whatever the policy says. Sales compensation should be built on volume, margin to the supplier, service metrics and customer satisfaction, and it should be reviewed by legal before it is issued.

Designing a compliant pricing policy

A channel policy that survives scrutiny has four features.

It is unilateral and published. The supplier announces the policy; it is not negotiated into individual agreements as a price term. Distributors accept the policy as a condition of authorised status.

It is objective. The criteria are measurable and applied consistently, with a documented process for appointment, review and termination.

It does not enforce price. No rebate, supply allocation, marketing support or termination decision turns on the distributor’s resale price. If the commercial team wants to reward price discipline, the reward has to be structured around something else — service levels, volume, market development.

It is reviewed. The competition analysis depends on market shares and market structure, which change. A policy that was defensible at five per cent share may not be at thirty.

Those four features are the test. The build sequence below is how a company gets there.

  1. State the objective. Write down what the channel policy is for: brand presentation, service quality, counterfeit avoidance, territorial coverage, protection of pre-sales investment. An objective that is really “higher prices” will not survive the first internal review, and it is better to discover that before the policy is issued.
  2. Choose the instrument that matches the objective. Service free-riding is answered by service obligations and selective distribution. Channel conflict is answered by territory and customer allocation. Advertising consistency is answered by a minimum advertised price policy. Price is not the instrument for any of these.
  3. Define the market and estimate the share. Use independent data, record the sources, and write the analysis down with a date. The safe harbour and any rebuttal both depend on this document, and neither can be reconstructed after a complaint.
  4. Draft the policy as a unilateral instrument. Terms, criteria, application process, review cycle, consequences for breach of the non-price criteria, and an express statement that pricing remains the distributor’s decision.
  5. Separate the policy from the contract. The authorised-dealer agreement should incorporate the policy by reference and should contain no resale price term. Where a legacy agreement contains one, amend it at the next renewal and document the amendment.
  6. Clean the commercial machinery. Rebate schedules, allocation rules, marketing-fund conditions, promotion approvals, sales KPIs and CRM fields all have to be checked. A price term that survives in a rebate schedule is still a price term.
  7. Set a communication protocol. Name who may discuss pricing with distributors (in practice, nobody), script the answer to the question “is the recommended price mandatory”, and require any pricing discussion to be logged and escalated.
  8. Monitor the right things. Monitor service levels, stock, training and warranty performance. If the company tracks market prices for intelligence, keep that data out of the distributor file and out of any decision about supply.
  9. Train and audit. Train the sales team annually on what may and may not be said, audit the channel documents annually, and review sales compensation before it is issued.
  10. Review the analysis annually. Market share moves, the platform rules change, and an enforcement priority that did not exist last year may exist now.
StepOwnerTypical timingWhat foreign companies miss
Objective and instrument selectionCommercial director with legalBefore draftingThe objective is written after the policy, which produces a policy that cannot be explained
Market definition and share analysisLegal with external economist4–8 weeksInternal estimates are not evidence; the sources and the date have to be recorded
Policy drafting and translationLegal2–4 weeksThe Chinese text is the operative one, and a loose translation of “recommended” becomes “required”
Contract and rebate clean-upLegal and finance4–8 weeksLegacy price clauses survive in rebate schedules and promotion approvals
Distributor communicationCommercialAt issueA covering email that explains the price expectation undoes the policy
Sales training and scriptsLegal and HRBefore the next selling cycleNew account managers are trained once and then never again
Annual audit and reviewLegal and complianceAnnuallyThe file is not updated when the share changes

Platform pricing and the lowest-price problem

The most common flashpoint in China is not a written minimum price but a platform promotion. A distributor lists on a marketplace, the platform runs a subsidy event, and the supplier discovers that the product is being sold below the price it expected.

The supplier’s instinct is to instruct the distributor to withdraw from the promotion or to raise the price. That instruction, repeated across a channel, is the conduct that competition authorities treat as resale price maintenance, whatever the agreement says.

There are lawful responses. The supplier can decline to fund the promotion, can limit the marketing support it provides, can adjust the wholesale price for future orders, or can terminate a promotion agreement that has been breached. What it cannot safely do is require the distributor to sell at a specified price as a condition of continued supply.

Platform rules add a layer. Some platforms impose their own price-parity or lowest-price requirements, and a supplier that participates may find itself implementing a price restraint it did not design. Those arrangements should be reviewed as part of the same exercise, because the authority looks at the effect rather than at who wrote the clause.

Two further platform features deserve attention. The first is the platform’s own price-comparison and “lowest price” labelling, which can push a distributor to discount without any instruction from the supplier; the supplier’s response should be a commercial one, such as funding a different promotion, rather than a direction on price. The second is the authorised-store system: a supplier can control which stores are authorised, and can set criteria for authorisation that relate to counterfeit risk, service and presentation, but it cannot use de-authorisation as a sanction for discounting.

Vertical restraints that are not about price

Price is not the only vertical restraint, and non-price restraints are analysed under a different and generally more forgiving framework.

Territorial restrictions, exclusive customer allocations, selective distribution and minimum purchase obligations are assessed for their effect on competition, with attention to whether they protect investment, prevent free-riding, or foreclose rivals. They are lawful where they are proportionate and where the supplier has the market position to justify them.

The risk arises when a non-price restraint is used to achieve a price outcome. An exclusive territory combined with a prohibition on out-of-territory sales at a discount is a price restraint in substance. A selective distribution system whose criteria are applied to exclude discounters is a price restraint in substance. The authority looks through the label.

The same logic applies to exclusivity. A single-branding obligation that requires a distributor to carry only the supplier’s products can be justified where the supplier invests in the distributor’s showroom, training and stock. It becomes a competition problem where it forecloses a rival’s access to the only viable channel in a concentrated market, and it becomes a price problem where it is traded for price compliance.

Resale price maintenance in franchising

Franchising presents the hardest case, because the franchisor has a legitimate interest in protecting brand standards and because the franchisee operates under the franchisor’s mark.

A franchisor may require uniform pricing where the price is an element of the brand identity and where the franchisee’s remuneration is structured as a commission on sales at the franchisor’s price. That is closer to agency than to resale, and the analysis differs.

Where the franchisee buys the goods and resells them on its own account, a fixed resale price is a vertical price restraint and carries the same presumption. The franchise agreement should therefore separate the standards that protect the brand — store design, service levels, product range, staff training — from any price term, and should avoid commercial consequences that attach to discounting.

In practice the franchise model in China often sits between the two. The franchisee buys stock but the franchisor controls the menu, the packaging and the customer experience, and the brand promise includes a price point. Where that is the commercial reality, the safer structure is to move the economics towards commission or consignment so that the franchisor genuinely bears the risk that the price is set to manage, and to document the allocation. A structure that takes the label of franchise, the risk allocation of distribution and the price control of agency has the worst of all three.

Complaints, investigations and the compliance file

A complaint from a distributor about another distributor’s pricing is a compliance event, not a customer service issue.

The first step is to route it away from the sales team. A regional manager who responds by contacting the discounter has created the evidence that the authority will rely on. The complaint should go to legal or compliance, be logged, and be answered with a statement that pricing is a matter for each distributor.

The second step is to check whether any commercial term ties supply, rebates or support to price. If it does, it should be removed before the complaint escalates.

The third step is to preserve the documents. An investigation may follow months later, and the internal correspondence will be read in the way the authority chooses.

The State Administration for Market Regulation and its local bureaus have powers to enter premises, inspect documents, copy records, question staff and seize evidence. A foreign-invested company is not immune, and the local bureau may act on a complaint from a distributor or a competitor.

Three practical measures reduce the damage of an investigation. A documented compliance programme, because it is relevant to penalty and to the credibility of the company’s position. A single point of contact for investigators, so that responses are consistent. And a document retention policy that keeps the commercial rationale for channel decisions, because the absence of a rationale is read as the absence of one.

The leniency regime applies to cartels, and its application to vertical arrangements is limited. A supplier that discovers a price restriction in its own channel should not assume that self-reporting will produce immunity.

What self-reporting can achieve is the correction of the conduct before a complaint is made, which reduces the period of the infringement and the exposure. The legal analysis should be documented, the term removed, and the change communicated to distributors in a way that does not create a new restraint.

A word on the correction itself. Withdrawing a price clause by email that says “following legal advice we can no longer require you to maintain the price, but we hope you will continue to support the brand at the recommended level” restates the expectation and preserves the exposure. The correction should be a clean amendment, with no reference to what the supplier would prefer, and it should be issued by legal rather than by the sales team.

The export dimension

A supplier that manufactures in China and sells to distributors abroad may assume that Chinese competition law does not apply. That assumption is wrong where the conduct has an effect on competition in China, and it is also incomplete, because the destination market has its own rules.

The EU and the UK treat resale price maintenance as a hardcore restriction, subject to narrow block exemptions. The US applies a rule of reason after the 2007 Leegin decision, but state law and enforcement practice vary. A single global channel policy that fixes minimum prices will be unlawful in most of the markets a Chinese manufacturer sells into, and the fact that the instruction was issued from Shenzhen does not change that.

The reverse flow matters too. A foreign supplier that sells into China through a Chinese distributor is subject to Chinese law for that channel, whatever its global policy says, and a global policy that is lawful at home may be unlawful in China. The practical answer is a single policy framework with jurisdiction-specific annexes: the framework states the objectives and the non-price criteria, and each annex states what may and may not be done in that market.

Where foreign companies get this wrong

Drafting the policy around price and calling it something else. A “brand value protection policy” whose only operative criterion is the resale price is a price clause with a different title, and the authority reads the substance.

Letting the sales team enforce the recommendation. The written policy is usually clean. The exposure sits in the chat messages, the quarterly business reviews and the allocation decisions, and those are the documents the authority obtains first.

Relying on the safe harbour without a market analysis. The share threshold is a screening device that requires a defined market and evidence of the share. A supplier that has never defined its market cannot rely on a threshold expressed as a share of it.

Using rebates as a compliance lever. A rebate schedule with a price-compliance condition converts a lawful volume incentive into a price floor, and it is the single most common documentary finding in Chinese RPM cases.

Treating a platform promotion as a commercial problem only. The instruction to withdraw from a subsidy event is a price instruction, and it is usually sent in writing, by the person with the least training and the most exposure.

Cost and commercial impact

The direct cost of an infringement is the fine, calculated as a percentage of the previous year’s turnover, with the aggravated range applying where the conduct is repeated or resistant. For a company with a large Chinese turnover, the range between the low and high ends of the statutory band is the difference between a manageable charge and a material one.

The indirect costs are larger and less predictable. Confiscation of illegal gains can exceed the fine in a channel where the price floor was sustained for years. Follow-on damages claims by distributors and customers arrive after the decision, and they are assessed against the decision’s findings. The channel itself is disrupted: distributors that relied on the price floor have to reprice, and the supplier’s relationship with them is renegotiated at the worst moment.

The compliance cost is real but modest by comparison: a market analysis, a policy redraft, a contract clean-up, training and an annual audit. Most of that work is done once and refreshed annually, and it produces a file that is useful in any investigation, whether or not one arrives.

There is a cost on the other side of the ledger, which the commercial team will raise. A supplier that gives up all price influence may see margin erosion, channel conflict and a decline in service investment. That is why the lawful tools matter: service obligations, selective distribution and territory allocation protect the investment without fixing the price, and they are the answer to the commercial objection rather than a concession to it.

Building the compliance file

The file that matters is the one prepared before the investigation, not after.

It should contain the market definition and the share analysis, the channel policy and its objective criteria, the training records, the pricing communications, and the rationale for each material channel decision. It should be reviewed annually, because the market share that supported the analysis last year may not support it now.

The file is not a defence in itself. It is the evidence that the company thought about the question, and in a regime where the burden sits on the supplier, thinking about the question in a documented way is most of the answer.

Practical checklist

  1. Review every clause and practice that touches distributor pricing, including rebates and supply allocation.
  2. Remove fixed minimum prices and replace them with non-binding recommendations where a price signal is wanted.
  3. Separate price from authorised-status criteria, and base those criteria on service and capability.
  4. Publish and apply the channel policy consistently, with a documented process.
  5. Train sales staff on the boundary between recommendation and requirement, and script the answer to the direct question.
  6. Assess market share before relying on any safe harbour, and record the sources.
  7. Audit the rebate schedules, the promotion approvals and the sales incentive plan for price conditions.
  8. Keep the price-intelligence data out of the distributor file and out of supply decisions.
  9. Review the position annually, because the analysis changes with the market.
  10. Log and escalate distributor complaints about pricing to legal rather than to the account team.

Our commercial dispute team advises on competition compliance in distribution and defends companies in investigations and follow-on claims. The channel design questions that sit upstream of pricing — appointment, territory, exclusivity and termination — are covered in Distribution, Agency and Channel Partnerships in China and in Terminating a Chinese Distributor. Companies that need the procedural picture for a dispute that has already started will find it in AI-Related Disputes in China.

This article reflects the position as of late 2026. Antitrust enforcement priorities and the implementing rules for vertical agreements continue to develop, and any pricing arrangement should be assessed against the current rules and the specific market.

Frequently Asked Questions↑ Back to article

Is resale price maintenance illegal in China?

It is treated as a vertical monopoly agreement and carries a presumption of illegality. The supplier can rebut the presumption by showing that the arrangement does not substantially restrict competition, but the burden is on the supplier and the evidence required is demanding. In practice, a fixed minimum resale price imposed on distributors is difficult to defend.

Can we set a maximum resale price?

A maximum price is generally treated more leniently than a minimum price, because it constrains rather than protects margin, but it is still a vertical price restriction and should be assessed in context. A recommended retail price, clearly non-binding, is the lowest-risk instrument.

Is a recommended retail price safe?

A genuinely non-binding recommendation is generally acceptable, provided it is not combined with monitoring, sanctions or incentives that make it effectively mandatory. The risk arises from enforcement practice: a recommendation backed by withheld rebates, delayed supply or termination is a fixed price in substance.

What is the safe harbour for vertical agreements?

The implementing provisions of the Anti-Monopoly Law provide a safe harbour for vertical agreements where the parties' market shares fall below the stated threshold and the other conditions are met. The burden of establishing the conditions rests on the parties, and the safe harbour does not apply where the agreement has the effect of excluding or restricting competition in a defined way.

What penalties apply to resale price maintenance?

The Anti-Monopoly Law allows fines of one to ten per cent of the previous year's turnover for concluding a monopoly agreement, with higher penalties for aggravated cases, and the authority can order cessation of the conduct and confiscate illegal gains. Private damages claims by distributors or consumers are also possible, and follow-on claims often follow an administrative decision.

Can we use selective distribution to control price?

Selective distribution is lawful where the criteria are objective, applied without discrimination and proportionate to the product, and where the system does not go beyond what is necessary. It can support brand and service standards, but it cannot be used as a disguised price-fixing mechanism, and the criteria should be published and applied consistently.

Do these rules apply to online sales?

Yes. Restrictions on selling through online platforms, on pricing across channels and on the use of platform discounts are assessed under the same rules, and the platform economy has been a particular enforcement focus. A clause that prohibits online resale below a price is a price restriction whatever the channel.

Geason Law Offices AI Industry Research Group | Reviewed by He Qianggao (Lawyer License No. 14403201310092337, 10+ years of practice)