A foreign company that manufactures AI hardware in China usually arrives with a compliance plan built around imports. It has thought about tariffs, about which entity will act as importer of record, and about the certification the product needs before it can be sold. What it has usually not asked is whether the product, the software embedded in it, or the process used to make it can lawfully leave China.

That question now reaches a wider range of products than most founders assume. China’s export control system has grown from a narrow list of military and nuclear items into a framework that covers dual-use technology, a set of AI-related items added to the catalogue in 2023, advanced semiconductor equipment and materials, and commercial encryption. The obligations attach to the exporter, and a wholly foreign-owned factory shipping its own parent’s design is an exporter.

The practical conclusion is that classification is the deliverable. Before the first shipment a company needs a written, dated and reasoned record of what it is exporting, which list entry or catch-all provision applies, and what conclusion follows from that. A company that cannot produce such a record is exposed even when its conclusion is correct, because the prohibition is on exporting a controlled item without a licence and the answer to an investigation is a documented process rather than a recollection of what the engineering team believed.

What China’s export control system actually consists of

The foundation is the Export Control Law, in force since 2020. It created a single statutory framework covering dual-use items, military items and nuclear items, and it did something that matters to foreign groups: it imposed obligations on any exporter operating from China, regardless of the nationality of the shareholders.

Underneath the law sit several lists and regimes that operate in parallel and are administered by different parts of the state.

The Dual-Use Items Catalogue is the main list for goods, software and technology with both civilian and military applications. It is updated periodically, and the 2023 revision added a group of AI-related items. Because the catalogue is amended rather than replaced, a classification carried out two years ago may no longer be current.

The Prohibited and Restricted Export Catalogue deals with items that may not be exported at all, or only within quantitative limits. It is a shorter list and a harder prohibition.

Technology is controlled separately from goods. The catalogue of technologies whose export is prohibited or restricted, administered by the commerce and science ministries, governs the transfer of technology out of China whether or not a physical product moves. That regime reaches licences to foreign parties, the transfer of process know-how to an overseas affiliate, and in some cases the disclosure of technical data to a foreign national. It is the regime most often overlooked, because it does not appear on a shipping document.

Commercial encryption has its own track, administered with the cryptography authority. A connected device with encryption capability may engage it even where no dual-use entry applies.

Temporary controls are the mechanism used for rapid response. China has used them for certain rare earth materials and semiconductor-related materials, and they can be imposed with little notice. A supply chain that depends on a material subject to temporary controls can change status between the purchase order and the shipment.

A State Council regulation on dual-use items, which took effect at the end of 2024, consolidated much of the previously scattered licensing practice into a single administrative instrument and clarified the general licence route for repeated transactions. The consolidation did not narrow the scope. It made the process more legible, which in practice makes it harder to argue that a company did not know a licence was needed.

What the system does not do is function as a sanctions regime aimed only at adversaries. It applies to exports to any destination, including to a parent company in a friendly jurisdiction. That is the feature foreign groups most consistently misread.

Who the controls bind, and where the obligation actually sits

The starting proposition is that the controls bind the exporter, meaning the party that files the export declaration or that transfers the technology out of China. In a manufacturing arrangement that is usually the Chinese entity, whether it is a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, a joint venture or a contract manufacturer acting on your instructions.

Four consequences follow, and each has caught a foreign group that thought of itself as outside the regime.

The first is that ownership is irrelevant. A wholly foreign-owned factory is a Chinese exporter. The fact that the design came from the parent, that the customer is the parent, and that the goods never touch a third party does not remove the licensing requirement if the item is controlled.

The second is re-export. A company that imports a controlled item into China, incorporates it into a finished product and ships the product out has exported the item again. Whether a fresh licence is needed depends on the item, the incorporation and the destination, and the analysis is rarely as simple as the importer assumes.

The third is the transfer of technology to your own people. Sending a schematic, a process recipe, a training module or a set of test parameters from the Chinese entity to the overseas parent is a transfer of technology out of China. Sending the same material to a foreign engineer visiting the Chinese site raises a parallel question, because disclosure to a foreign national within China is treated in several regimes as equivalent to an export.

The fourth is the boundary with domestic sales. A product sold and delivered inside China is not an export and the export control regime does not apply to that sale. Other regimes may, including product certification, data protection and, for some categories, security review of foreign investment. The point is only that the export control analysis should not be applied to a domestic transaction and should not be assumed to end at the factory gate either.

Classification, and why the record matters more than the answer

Classification is the process of deciding whether an item, a piece of software or a technology falls within a controlled entry, and if so which one. In the Chinese system it means reading the technical parameters in the catalogue against the actual characteristics of what is being shipped, and recording the comparison.

Three distinctions shape the exercise.

Goods, software and technology are classified separately. A device may be uncontrolled while the algorithm inside it is controlled, or the reverse. A manufacturing process may be controlled even where the product made by it is not. Companies that classify only the physical product leave the larger exposure unaddressed.

The parameters are technical, not commercial. A catalogue entry typically describes performance characteristics, precision, throughput or material properties rather than a product category. Whether a given module meets a threshold is an engineering question that needs an engineering answer, and the answer should be recorded with the measurement or datasheet that supports it.

The classification is time-bound. A design change, a new supplier, a firmware update, a new destination or a catalogue amendment can each alter the conclusion. The record should carry a review date and a list of trigger events that require re-review.

The record itself should contain the description of the item including model and function, the technical parameters relied on, the catalogue entry considered, the reasoning, the conclusion, the identity of the person who concluded it, and the date. Where the conclusion is that nothing applies, the record should say why, because “not listed” is a conclusion that has to be supported.

A practical point about the consumer product trap. A company making a consumer device with an AI accelerator inside will often classify the device and stop. The module may be separately controlled, the design tools used to develop the chip may be controlled, and the manufacturing process may engage equipment controls. The finished product is not the only object of the exercise.

Where the analysis is genuinely uncertain, the commerce authority can be asked for an opinion, and the request itself creates a record of diligence. Test houses and specialist counsel can carry out a technical assessment. The cost of either is small against the cost of a shipment held at the border.

The licence application and what the file must contain

Two routes exist. A general licence covers repeated exports of a defined item to defined destinations and end users over a period, and suits a company with a predictable flow. An individual licence covers a specific transaction, and is the route for a first shipment, an unusual destination or an end user that requires scrutiny.

The application is an evidentiary exercise rather than a form. The authority is deciding whether the item will end up where the applicant says it will, and the file has to answer that question convincingly.

The technical description must identify the item precisely enough that an official can match it to a catalogue entry: model, function, key parameters, and the software or technology bundled with it. A description that says “AI edge device” invites a request for more information and adds weeks.

The end-user and end-use statement must identify the legal entity that will use the item, its address, the facility, the purpose and the industry. Vague end uses are the most common reason for delay.

The end-user certificate is the document that carries the most weight and is most often prepared badly. It should be on the recipient’s letterhead, signed by an authorised officer, and it should state the identity of the recipient, the item and quantity, the end use, a commitment not to re-transfer the item without the exporter’s consent and the authority’s approval, and a commitment to allow verification. Many destinations also require the certificate to be endorsed by a government authority, and an unendorsed certificate from a country that requires endorsement will be rejected.

The underlying contract should be consistent with the application. A mismatch between the quantity in the contract and the quantity in the licence is a routine cause of a held shipment.

Corporate documents establish that the applicant is a legitimate exporter with the scope to trade in the item. The business scope point matters more than it appears: a Chinese entity whose registered scope covers consulting but not the sale of the relevant goods creates a question at the licensing stage and again at the bank.

An internal compliance programme description is increasingly expected, particularly for a general licence. It should set out how the company classifies, screens, records, trains and audits.

On signature, the Chinese applicant signs through its legal representative and affixes the company seal. The foreign end user signs through an authorised officer, and the authority may ask for evidence of that authority. Certificates that arrive signed by a sales manager with no indication of position are treated as weak.

Processing time varies with the sensitivity of the item, the destination and the completeness of the file. Weeks are normal for a straightforward individual licence and months are normal where the item or destination attracts scrutiny. The licence, once issued, names the item, the quantity, the destination and the end user. Any change to those particulars requires an amendment, and shipping against a licence whose particulars no longer match is treated as shipping without a licence.

The licence number must appear on the customs declaration. Customs checks the declaration against the licence, and a discrepancy stops the shipment at the port. This is where the compliance function and the logistics function have to talk to each other, because the declaration is usually prepared by a forwarder working from an invoice.

Record-keeping is a statutory obligation rather than good practice. The law sets a retention period and the working assumption should be at least five years, covering licences, applications, end-user certificates, contracts, declarations and the classification records. The records are the evidence in any investigation, and they are also what a general licence renewal will be assessed against.

The home-country side, and why two regimes are worse than one

Chinese controls are only half of the exposure. The technology, the design tools and the components that went into the product may be subject to the controls of the country they came from, and those controls follow the technology into China and out again.

In the United States the Export Administration Regulations classify items by export control classification number, with items outside the lists treated as EAR99 and subject to end-use and end-user controls rather than list-based licensing. Licensing depends on the classification, the destination and the end user. The regulations reach beyond US-origin goods through the de minimis principle, under which a foreign-made product containing more than a defined proportion of controlled US-origin content remains subject to US controls, and through the foreign direct product rules, which can capture items made outside the United States using US technology or equipment.

For an AI hardware company the practical effect is that a product designed in California, prototyped with US design software, manufactured on equipment containing US components and assembled in Guangdong may be within the scope of both regimes at once. The Chinese licence governs the export from China. The US rules may govern the same shipment, and may also govern the disclosure of the design to the Chinese factory in the first place.

The European Union operates its own dual-use regulation, with a list that overlaps the Chinese and US lists without matching either. Several member states administer additional national controls, particularly on semiconductor equipment and on cyber-surveillance items. The United Kingdom, Japan and the Netherlands each maintain controls that matter in specific supply chains.

The compliance burden is therefore cumulative. A single shipment may require a Chinese licence, a US authorisation and an EU authorisation, and the three applications ask for different information in different formats.

Where the regimes collide, and what to do about it

The collisions are predictable once a company has classified properly, and they are easier to manage before a product is designed than afterwards.

The first collision is a product that requires a Chinese licence to export and a US licence to re-export. Both applications may be granted, but they may be granted on different terms: different permitted end users, different quantities, different destinations. The narrower of the two governs, and the contract should be drafted so that performance is conditional on both.

The second is a product that one authority will license and the other will refuse. This is not a drafting problem and cannot be solved by contract. It is a design problem, and the answer is usually to remove the controlled content from the product or to restructure where the controlled step happens. That decision has to be taken before tooling, because after tooling the cost of change is measured in moulds and certification.

The third is the end user. A customer in a third country may be acceptable to one regime and listed by another. Screening has to run against all applicable lists, not only the home country’s.

The fourth is the people. A Chinese subsidiary staffed partly by engineers seconded from the parent is a setting in which technology moves in both directions continuously, through email, through meetings and through access to a shared server. Each direction may be a controlled transfer. The controls that work are mundane: access limited by role, a document classification scheme that the engineering team actually uses, and a rule that design files do not leave the corporate system except through an approved channel.

The fifth is data. Technical data transferred out of China may engage the data export rules administered by the cyberspace authority as well as the export control regime, particularly where the data includes personal information from testing or field trials. The two analyses are separate and both have to be done.

Allocating regulatory risk in the contract

Export control risk is allocated by silence when the contract does not allocate it. The default position in most supply contracts is that the seller must obtain any export authorisation and that a failure to deliver is a breach. That default suits a buyer and is unacceptable to a Chinese supplier, which will ask for a clause excluding liability where a licence is refused. The negotiation is about where between those two positions the risk sits, and it is worth conducting deliberately rather than discovering the answer during a detention.

The first term is a condition precedent. Delivery should be conditional on the required licence being granted, and neither party should be in breach while an application is pending, provided the applicant pursues it diligently and evidences progress. Without that clause, the delivery date runs from signature and the supplier is in breach on day one of a three-month licensing process.

The second is the allocation of the application itself. The exporter applies, because only the Chinese entity can. The buyer supplies the end-user certificate and the end-use information, because only the buyer knows the destination and the customer. The contract should put a deadline on the buyer’s information, make late or inaccurate information a buyer risk event with a corresponding extension of time, and require the supplier to file within a stated period of receiving a complete file.

The third is change of law. A catalogue amendment or a temporary control can turn a lawful shipment into a prohibited one between order and delivery. The clause should define what counts as a change, require notice within a short period of the supplier becoming aware, and provide a mechanism that adjusts price, timeline and scope before either party can terminate. A change of law clause drafted for tax purposes rarely covers export control, because it refers to laws affecting cost rather than laws affecting legality.

The fourth is the classification warranty, and it should be split. The supplier warrants that it has classified the item, that the classification record is accurate and current, and that it will notify the buyer of any change. The buyer warrants the accuracy of the end-use and end-user information it provides and the lawfulness of the destination. Each party warrants the facts it controls, which is the only allocation that survives scrutiny.

The fifth is the indemnity and its interaction with the liability cap. A supplier will accept an indemnity for its own false statements and for a failure to apply, and will resist uncapped liability for a refusal that followed a diligent application. A buyer will want export control breaches carved out of the cap entirely. The compromise that works in practice carves out conduct within the supplier’s control and leaves a refusal after a proper application inside the cap, with a long-stop date after which either party may terminate and the buyer recovers work in progress.

The sixth is information and audit. The buyer should have the right to see the licence, the classification record and the customs declaration, and the supplier should be obliged to notify any enquiry, detention or investigation within a defined period. Notification clauses of this kind are what allow a buyer to protect its own customers before the news arrives from elsewhere.

The seventh is flow-down. The obligation has to reach the sub-supplier, the trading company intermediary and the forwarder. A forwarder that files a declaration inconsistent with the licence creates a violation for the exporter, and the logistics terms should say so.

The eighth is the dual-licence point. Where the home country’s controls also apply, delivery should be conditional on both authorisations, and the contract should say which party is responsible for which. A single condition referring to “all necessary export licences” sounds adequate and is not, because it leaves the apportionment of cost and delay unresolved when one authority grants and the other does not.

Documents, filings and timeline

StepAuthorityTypical timingWhat foreign companies miss
Classification of goods, software and technologyInternal, with technical inputTwo to six weeks for a product familyOnly the finished product is classified, not the module or the process
Internal compliance programmeInternal, reviewed on auditFour to eight weeks to documentWritten after the first licence application rather than before
End-user certificateForeign recipient, sometimes endorsed by its governmentTwo to eight weeksSigned by someone with no evidenced authority
Individual licence applicationCommerce authority or its local branchWeeks to monthsQuantity in the application does not match the contract
General licence applicationCommerce authorityLonger, with a higher evidentiary barApplied for before the compliance programme exists
Customs declaration with licence numberCustomsAt exportLicence particulars changed and no amendment obtained
Technology transfer reviewCommerce and science authorities, where the technology catalogue appliesWeeksTransfer to the parent treated as internal and exempt
Record retentionInternalOngoingRecords held by a forwarder rather than the exporter
Re-export reviewCommerce authority, plus the home authorityBefore shipmentImported controlled component assumed to be free once inside China
Periodic re-classificationInternalOn catalogue change, design change or new destinationClassification never reviewed after the first shipment

Where foreign companies get this wrong

The first failure is assuming that a consumer product is uncontrolled. The device may be, while the accelerator, the encryption module or the design tool is not. The consequence is a shipment held at the port, an investigation that reaches back through prior shipments, and a customer who learns about it before you do.

The second is treating the parent’s own technology as exempt. A Chinese subsidiary sending a design package to its shareholder is transferring technology out of China. The file that was never meant to be an export becomes the central exhibit.

The third is relying on the factory’s licence. Contract manufacturers hold licences for their own exports of their own products. They do not hold a licence for your item, and a factory that says it will “handle the paperwork” is usually describing a customs broker filing a declaration under an existing general licence that does not cover what you are shipping.

The fourth is applying for a licence after the purchase order. The licence names a quantity and an end user, and the commercial pressure to ship before it issues is considerable. Shipping first and licensing afterwards converts an administrative delay into a violation, and the penalty framework is not proportionate: fines can reach ten times the value of the goods, or a fixed sum in the millions of renminbi where the goods have no declared value, with confiscation of the goods and of the illegal gains, revocation of export rights and criminal liability for serious cases. A company can also be placed on the unreliable entity list, which affects its ability to trade in both directions.

The fifth is a compliance programme that exists as a document. The authority and, in a dispute, a court will look for evidence that the programme operated: training records, screening logs, classification records, escalation decisions. A policy with no records behind it demonstrates that the company knew the rules and did not follow them.

The sixth is ignoring the destination side of the same transaction. A Chinese export licence does not satisfy a US re-export requirement, and a US licence does not satisfy a Chinese one. Companies that treat the two as alternative routes discover at the port that they needed both.

Cost and commercial impact

The cost of compliance is front-loaded and visible: classification work, programme documentation, licence applications, end-user certificates, legal review of contracts and, for a general licence, an audit function. Relative to a tooling programme or a certification campaign these are modest, and most of them are one-off for a product family.

The cost of non-compliance is neither modest nor one-off. A held shipment at the port is the least of it, because the goods can usually be released once the paperwork is corrected. The serious costs are the investigation into prior shipments, the loss of export rights for a period, the inability to obtain future licences, the contractual consequences of failing to deliver, and the effect on customers who discover that their supplier is under scrutiny. For a company raising money, an open export control matter is a diligence item that delays or reprices the round.

There is a third cost that rarely appears in a budget: the cost of designing a product that cannot be exported to its intended market. A design decision taken to hit a performance target can place a product inside a control list, and the remedy at that point is a redesign, a re-certification and, if tooling is involved, a new mould. The classification exercise belongs in the product definition stage for exactly this reason.

The comparison worth putting to a board is between the cost of classifying a product family properly and the cost of discovering the classification question after the first container has sailed. The first is a project. The second is an incident.

Practical checklist

Export control questions arrive early in a hardware programme and are usually answered late. We advise foreign AI and hardware companies on classification, licensing, supply chain structuring and the contract terms that allocate regulatory risk between a parent, its Chinese entity and its manufacturing partners. The relevant service pages are commercial contracts and incorporation. Three companion guides cover the adjacent ground: Shenzhen hardware: from prototype to mass production, China hardware and supply chain guide, and China customs clearance and import/export.

Frequently Asked Questions↑ Back to article

What export controls apply to AI hardware in China?

China maintains several layers of export control: the Export Control Law (2020), the Dual-Use Items Catalogue, the Prohibited and Restricted Export Catalogue, and specific control lists for items like encryption technology and certain AI-related items. In 2023, China added 23 AI-related items to its export control catalogue.

Do export controls apply to foreign companies in China?

Yes. China's export controls apply to anyone exporting controlled items from China, including foreign-invested enterprises. If your company manufactures in China and exports products containing controlled items, you need to comply with Chinese export control regulations. Additionally, your home country's export controls may apply to technology or products you bring into China.

What are the most relevant controls for AI hardware?

The most relevant categories are: (1) dual-use items — goods, software and technology with both civilian and military applications, (2) encryption technology — if your hardware includes encryption capabilities, (3) certain AI chips and related technologies, and (4) advanced manufacturing equipment and technology for semiconductors.

What happens if you violate export controls?

Violations can result in: fines (up to 10x the value of the goods, or RMB 5 million for items without value), confiscation of illegal gains, revocation of export licences, criminal liability for serious cases, and being added to the unreliable entity list. For foreign companies, violations can also affect your ability to operate in China going forward.

What is the difference between an export license and an export permit?

In China, export licenses are broad authorizations for a company to engage in export activities, while export permits (or export approval documents) are specific approvals for controlled items. For AI hardware with dual-use potential, you typically need both: a general export license for the company, and a specific permit for the controlled product or technology.

What is the dual-use export licence application process in China?

To obtain a dual-use export licence from MOFCOM, you must submit technical documentation describing the item, end-user certificates from the foreign recipient, and detailed information about the end use and end user. Processing time varies but can take several weeks to months. There are two main types: general licences for specific items to specific destinations, and individual licences for specific transactions. The type you need depends on what you are exporting and where.

How do two-way export controls affect foreign AI hardware companies in China?

Foreign AI hardware companies face export controls from multiple directions simultaneously. Chinese export controls apply to products, software, and technology shipped out of China, including dual-use items and certain AI chips. Meanwhile, your home country controls — such as US BIS rules or the EU Dual-Use Regulation — may apply to technology, equipment, or software you bring into China, and the de minimis rule can extend US controls to products manufactured in China containing US-origin technology. The challenge is complying with multiple, sometimes contradictory regimes at once.

Geason Law Offices AI Industry Research Group | Reviewed by He Qianggao (Lawyer License No. 14403201310092337, 10+ years of practice)